




**CANDRIAM** 

A NEW YORK LIFE INVESTMENTS COMPANY

# Economic and financial outlook

**Anton Brender & Florence Pisani**

December 2021




**1. Pandemic  
Vaccination is progressing...  
but new cases are rising again**



# Since November, new cases have jumped in Europe

**New daily COVID-19 cases**  
(per million people, smoothed over 1 week)


**By region**




**Europe**



**Latin America**



**Asia**







# Some health systems could soon start to be under strain

## Current COVID-19 patients hospital occupancy



### Hospital beds occupied

(per million people, since July 2020)




### ICU beds occupied

(per million people, since July 2020)




## New hospitalizations / new cases

(% since December 2020)




## New deaths / new hospitalizations

(% since December 2020)




# After a slow start, the vaccination campaign in Asia has accelerated significantly


**New daily COVID-19 cases**  
(per million people, smoothed over 1 week)




**Number of doses administered**  
(per 100 inhabitants)



**Persons having received at least one dose**  
(%)



**Share in world exports**  
(%)





## 2. Global economy Manufacturing activity is still under stress

# For the last months, industrial production has been moving sideways...

## World trade and industrial production


(2010 = 100, volume)




## Industrial production

(January 2019 = 100, manufacturing)


### Advanced




### Emerging Asia



### Emerging Europe




### Latin America




## ... curbed in particular by supply constraints

### Global industrial production


(% / 6 months, annual rate)



### Global manufacturing PMI suppliers' delivery times




### Global manufacturing PMI input prices




### Shipping cost

(January 2019 = 100)




### Commodity prices

(January 2015 = 100)






# Supply bottlenecks will take time to resolve




- Only 5 of the top 20 ports in the world are located outside of East Asia
- More than 70% of the total volume of maritime transit through the region's ports, therefore any perturbation can have repercussions on global shipping, which represents an estimated 80% of world trade volume and 70% of global trade value.

## Global suppliers' delivery times by sector (change between February 2021 and Q2 2020)



- Sharp rise in the PMI for input prices
- More modest rise in PMI input prices






### 3. China

**The Communist Party is back...  
so are political challenges!**




Ju Peng/Xinhua, Associated Press  
NYT, 7 septembre 2021

# By the end of last year, business activity had returned to its pre-pandemic trend, but the "Zero Covid" strategy leads to recurring slowdowns!


### Total GDP



### GDP by sector (2019 Q4 = 100, volume)






### Services PMI and new Covid cases



(\* Per million inhabitants, smoothed over 7 days)

# At the end of 2021, PMIs point to stabilizing GDP growth


## China NBS Manufacturing PMI




# After a slowdown, growth should gradually accelerate... but uncertainties have increased



### Real GDP trajectory (2019 Q4 = 100)



### Real GDP growth (%, annual average)







# Efforts to reduce carbon emissions have slowed industrial activity and even led to power outages


## National carbon emissions

(million tons of carbon per year)




## Industrial production

(% year on year)




## Carbon emissions per capita

(million tons of carbon per year)





## Steel production


(June 2018 = 100)




# The deleveraging engineered by authorities has curbed activity in the real estate sector



### Residential building started and sold (% year on year)



### Housing prices (2<sup>nd</sup> hand residential buildings, % year on year)




Authorities stepped up the crackdown on the misuse of commercial loans and consumer loans in the property sector, and further tightened the use of shadow banking channels (such as trust loans and entrusted loans) by developers.


Local governors in cities that lack sufficient property market regulations and experience rapid housing price increases are now held accountable.

# Construction and real estate account for 30% of China's final demand: a major correction in those sectors could have a broad impact on activity


The final demand addressed to the construction and real estate sectors is more than twice the size of the value added of the two sectors  
(% of GDP, 2018)



Origin of value added in domestic final demand of construction & real estate  
(% of GDP, 2018)




Final demand of construction & real estate  
(% of each sector's value added, 2018)




# The ongoing credit crunch is triggering bankruptcies but stockholders, SOEs and the central government should absorb part of the losses, preventing the shock from becoming systemic


### Household debt (% of GDP)




### Mortgage and RE bank loans (% of GDP)




### Total property developers' debt (% of GDP)



### Non financial agents' debt (% of GDP)






### Real estate developers' leverage (net debt as a % of equity capital)




# If households continue to accumulate financial assets at an elevated pace, the fall in private borrowing may force the government to maintain a high public deficit for a while

## Net lending / borrowing capacity by sector (% of GDP)

### Households increase in financial assets and liabilities (% of GDP)



### Implied evolution in government debt (% of GDP)






# The government could of course try to reduce household savings by raising taxes on the richest households or companies: this would be in line with its “common prosperity” agenda


## Disposable income per capita by quintile

(in US dollars)

### Urban households





### Rural households




## Share in pre-tax national income

(%)




# To sum up, Chinese authorities are now confronted with many challenges: if they fail to keep the economy in balance, growth could easily be “subpar” in the coming years




- If China manages to stay close to the “frontier”, growth will be around 5% in the coming years...
- ... but if it were to be caught in a macroeconomic “saving trap”, growth could decelerate worryingly like it did in Japan.

# An economic slow down in China would have a significant impact on some countries and some sectors in the rest of the world (I)

## Foreign value added in China's final demand by country of origin (% of countries' GDP)



## Foreign value added in China's final demand by industry of origin (% of world ex China GDP)




# An economic slow down in China would have a significant impact on some countries and some sectors in the rest of the world (II)

## Foreign value added in China's final demand by country and industry of origin (% of countries' GDP)

### Equipment suppliers

### Commodity suppliers





## 4. United States Tapering... and then hiking






*Jerome Powell  
Nominated for second term as Chair of US Federal Reserve  
The Guardian*



# Activity has continued to rise in Q3 but at a more moderate pace




## GDP and its components

(2019 Q4 = 100, volume)





# While tensions in the manufacturing sector are still curbing production, the ISM services index has reached an all-time high

## ISM manufacturing




## ISM services




# After a sharp rebound, business investment has started to slow down but inventory building will provide an offset

## Phila Fed survey and investment



(\*) Intellectual Property Products


## Core equipment investment: (% quarter on quarter, annual rate)




## Core new orders and shipments (billions of dollars)



## Fixed capital formation (2018 Q1 = 100, volume)




## Inventories to sales ratio (business sector, volume)




# Rising house prices are now weighing on affordability... while bottlenecks and zoning constraints are curbing new constructions

## FHFA house price index

(% quarter on quarter, annual rate, purchase only)




## Interest rates and mortgage applications




## Inventories of houses

(months of supply)




## Existing and new home sales

(thousands, annual rate)









## New one family houses for sale but not started

(% of new one family houses for sale)




# Fiscal support is fading, compensations are now supporting consumption while the saving rate has normalized




# Accumulated excess savings remain elevated, but largely concentrated in the hands of the wealthiest households

**Cumulated excess financial savings since Q4 2019**  
(% of GDP)




**Increase in short term liquid assets by income quintile**  
(\$ billion, cumulated since Q4 2019)



# The President has signed the \$1 trillion bipartisan Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act but the Build Back Better Act is still on hold


## Build Back Better original and actual size

(\$ billion)



## Government investment


(% of GDP)




## What is left of the American Families plan?

More than meets the eyes!

(\$ billion, CRFB estimate)




## Deficit decreasing measures



# With growth soon to be above trend, the Fed will have to decide how close the economy can get to “maximum employment”

## Real GDP

(billions of constant dollars, annual rate)



Federal reserve  
(September 2021)  
Main scenario


## GDP growth

Main scenario

2021 = 5.5%  
2022 = 3.9%


## Unemployment rate

(%)




## Employment rate

(%)



## Cumulated change since Feb. 2020

(millions)



1.3  
-2.3  
-3.6


“If the path of progress made since last year were to continue, maximum employment could be achieved by the second half of next year.”

J. Powell




# The increase in labor turnover rates has helped push wages up


## Labor market evolution compared to maximum employment



## ECI wage and quits rate







## Median wages



# From the Fed's perspective the pick up in wages is welcome... as long as productivity gains provide an offset!


## Hourly earnings

(January 2019 = 100)



## ECI, productivity and core inflation


(% year on year)





"If wages were to be rising persistently and materially above inflation and productivity gains, that could put upward pressure on prices or downward pressure on margins, and you can find yourself in what we used to call a wage price spiral. We don't have evidence of that yet. Productivity has been very high." J. Powell, November 3, 2021

# Up to now at least, most of the acceleration in inflation reflects transitory factors

**Contribution to total inflation**  
(CPI, % year on year)




**Core components by behavior**  
(CPI, January 2019 = 100)




# Still, with good reasons for rents to rise, inflation will be slow to decelerate




### Rental vacancy rates (%)




### Rents (% year on year)



### CPI inflation forecasts



### (% annual average)






# The current bout of inflation resembles the post WWII episode: it then took two years for inflation to subside

## Three bouts of inflation

(% year on year, CPI)

Mid-60's and 70's



The rapid post-war inflationary episode was caused notably by supply shortages (supplies were running low or were exhausted entirely during the war and families had trouble buying cars and household appliances because they were essentially unavailable), pent-up demand was strong after wartime rationing and the elimination of price controls.

**This inflationary episode ended after two years as domestic and foreign supply chains normalized and consumer demand began to level off.**

The rise in inflation in the mid-60's was caused by a booming economy. From 1965 through 1969, real quarterly GDP growth averaged 4.8% at annual rate. Inflation fell after President Nixon instituted a freeze on wages and prices.

This bout of inflation was followed, in the 70's, by the longest stretch of heightened inflation because of two surges in oil prices. **The episode ended with Paul Volcker well-known campaign of hiking interest rates to bring inflation under control... at the cost of a severe recession.**



**The post-World War II period is perhaps the most relevant case study for today.** Supply shortages, a shift to durable goods consumption, pent-up demand for services and excess savings combine to drive up prices.

One substantial difference between the inflation dynamics of World War II and today is due to price controls which reduced the price level 30 percent below what it would have been otherwise. When the caps were lifted in 1946, prices climbed significantly.


# With the Fed starting to normalize its policy, long term rates should now increase

## Change in commercial banks' balance sheet (\$ billion, cumulated since October 2019)

### Fed funds rate expectations (%)



### ISM and 10-year interest rate





*ECB President Christine Lagarde and  
Deutsche Bundesbank chief Jens Weidmann  
Image Alliance / dpa | Arno Bergi*


## 5. Euro area

# The ECB can afford to be patient

# At the end of the third quarter, economic activity was almost back to its pre-crisis level



## Euro area real GDP

(2019 Q1 = 100)




## Euro area GDP components

(2019 Q1 = 100, 4 largest economies)



## Real GDP growth by country

(% compared to 2019 Q4 – 2021 Q3)






# The most affected sectors were still way below their pre-crisis level, especially in Spain


## GDP by sector

(2019 Q4 = 100)

### Euro area




### Share in GDP (%)




## Value added

(2019 Q4 = 100)


### Germany




### Belgium




### Netherlands




### Spain



### Italy



### France



# Except in Germany, most of the output gap was due to the fall in activity in the “trade, transport and accommodation & food sector”

## Contribution to growth


(cumulated % change between 2021Q2 and 2019 Q4)

Germany


France

Netherlands

Belgium



Euro area




Spain

Italy

Portugal

Greece





(\*) Wholesale & retail, transport, accommodation & food services

# Bankruptcies have jumped in some service sectors, in particular in Spain...


## Business creation and destructions during the COVID-19 Crisis

(new business registrations and bankruptcies % change from 2019 Q4 to 2021 Q3)



(\*) Education, health + Arts, entertainment and recreation + other services

N.B. The size of the bubbles are proportional to the sector size in total value added.




# ... but in most euro area countries, bankruptcies have been contained and business creations have remained rather dynamic


## Business creation and destructions during the COVID-19 Crisis

(new business registrations and bankruptcies % change from 2019 Q4 to 2021 Q3)


### Germany




### France




### Italy



### Netherlands



### Belgium



N.B. The size of the bubbles are proportional to the sector size in total value added.

(\*) Education, health + Arts, entertainment and recreation + other services

# Before the new wave of Covid cases, business surveys remain at elevated levels, pointing to an ongoing recovery

## European Commission surveys


### PMI indices



### Production expectations



### Employment expectations




# Supply constraints are now clearly curbing manufacturing activity ... in Germany in particular! (I)


## Factors limiting production in industry

(EC quarterly business survey, % of firms)


### Euro area



### Shortage of material and/or equipment




### Shortage of labor



## Factors limiting services production

(EC quarterly business survey, % of firms)


### Shortage of labor




# Supply constraints are now clearly curbing manufacturing activity

## ... in Germany in particular! (II)


**Euro area industrial production and new orders**  
(January 2014 = 100)




**Industrial production by country**  
(January 2014 = 100)



**German car production and orders**  
(2015 = 100)





**Firms' assessment of inventories**  
(European Commission survey)




# Firms' financial saving rates have jumped and financing conditions remain accommodative

**Non financial corporations' financial saving rate**  
(% of NFC gross value added)





**NFC cash coverage\***  
(%)



(\*) Cash as a percentage of four-quarter moving sums of gross interest payments.


**Loans to non financial corporations**  
(% year on year)








# Demand expectations should continue to support a moderate growth in equipment investment

**Euro area equipment investment and perceived demand**  
(% year on year)




**Perceived demand by country\*\***




**Investment by country**  
(2016 Q1 = 100)


**Equipment**



**Intellectual property products**



**Structures**




(\*) % year on year (including intellectual property rights)

(\*\*) Composite indicator: 0.7 x industry production trend + 0.3 x services recent evolution in demand


# With the exception of Spain, residential investment is recovering despite increasing supply-side headwinds and rising real estate prices

## Residential investment

(2006 Q1 = 100)




## EC construction survey




## Residential property prices

(% year on year)




## Loans to households

Euro area









## By country




# Memo: low interest have pushed home prices significantly higher in some countries

## Home prices and disposable income per capita (1994 Q1 = 100)




# At the end of Q3, the consumption gap was still not filled

**Retail sales ex cars**  
(January 2019 = 100)




**Car sales**

(January 2019 = 100)




**Durable goods consumption**

(2019 Q4 = 100, volume)




**Services consumption**

(2019 Q4 = 100, volume)



**Consumption**




(2019 Q1 = 100, volume)




# The new wave of Covid will lower mobility indicators, but the effects on fourth quarter activity should be muted

## Google mobility trends


(% compared to January 2020, smoothed over 7 days)



## Google mobility and GDP in the euro area




## Google mobility and composite PMI in the euro area



# The continuing improvement in the labor market should support consumption


## Employment growth in the Euro area

(% cumulated since 2019 Q4 up to 2021 Q3)




## Unemployment rates

(%)



## Employment


(January 2018 = 100)



# The rise in energy prices should not excessively curb household spending


## Gas prices

(CPI, January 2004 = 100)




## Electricity prices

(CPI, January 2004 = 100)




## Euro area gas price

(CPI, annual average, %)




## Euro area electricity price

(CPI, annual average, %)




## Energy share in CPI

(%, 2021)





## Impact on the euro area CPI of energy prices remaining at their recent peak

(CPI, % annual contribution)



# Accumulated savings surplus and measures taken by governments should help cushion the purchasing power shock for households...

## Households cumulated excess financial savings since Q4 2019



## Main measures taken by governments

**Germany:** 50% reduction of the fee on renewable energies in 2022 (i.e. -10% on the final price of electricity)

### France:

Gas prices capped between December 2021 and March 2022  
 Electricity price increase limited to 4% in early 2022  
 Energy vouchers for low-income households

### Italy:


Removal of infrastructure costs for electricity  
 66% reduction in infrastructure costs and reduction of VAT to 5% for gas  
 Support for low-income households

### Spain:





VAT cut to 10% and other electricity taxes cut  
 Gas price increase limited to 4.4% in September and tariff freeze until April 2022



# For the time being, consumer confidence is holding pretty well




- Consumer confidence (next 12 months)
- Unemployment
- Savings
- General economic situation
- Financial situation




# Public investment will support growth in 2022, in Southern countries in particular

## Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF)




## Expected cash disbursement from the RRF funds

(% of countries' GDP)









# October draft budgetary plans are consistent with a gradual decline in households financial savings (I)

**Euro area net lending (+) or borrowing (-)**  
(% of GDP, 4Q moving average)









# October draft budgetary plans are consistent with a gradual decline in households financial savings (II)

## Households net lending (+) or borrowing (-) (% of GDP, 4Q moving average)




# This implies that many countries will still have a public deficit higher than 3%... even in 2024!

## Net lending (+) or borrowing (-) (% of GDP, 4Q moving average)




## Export performances (2002 Q1 = 100)



# The slow rebalancing of public deficits should allow growth to be slightly above 4% in 2022... but discussions around the new Budget rules are likely to be heated...

“[...] The lessons from the financial crisis should serve as a cautionary tale. At that time, Europe declared victory too soon and we paid the price for that. And we will not repeat the same mistake.”  
Ursula von der Leyen,  
EC President, September 15 2021




**GDP  
growth**

2020 = -6.5%  
2021 = 4.8%  
2022 = 4.3%


... the more so since the “great debt divide” is here to stay for many more years!

## Medium term projections of public debt to GDP ratios (%)




# Even if it starts to taper in March 2022, the ECB has good reasons to remain accommodative


## Supply of government bonds in 2022 net of ECB purchases (€ billion)



## ECB inflation forecasts (% year on year)



## Core inflation and ECB forecasts (% year on year)






# Inflation may remain “higher for longer”...


## Euro area core inflation

(% year on year, CPI)


### Core inflation







### Contribution to core inflation



### “Pressure” sectors




### “Catch-up” sectors



... but up to now at least, it has not been driven by wage increases...


### Core CPI ex tax effect

(% year on year, 3 months moving average)




### Inflation forecast

(% year on year)





(% annual average)




### Negotiated wages

(%)

#### Euro area




#### By country




# Despite labor market improvements, the euro area is still far from full employment

## Employment rates (%)





### 15 to 24-year old



### 25 to 54-year old, women




### 25 to 54-year old, men



# Within the area, the employment divide is pretty worrying!



## Measures of underemployment (% of augmented labor force)





- Unemployed
- Underemployed part-time workers
- Persons seeking work but not immediately available
- Persons available to work but not seeking

# Memo: despite growing ECB bond buying, a substantial part of Italian and Spanish public debt is held by the “rest of the world”

**Central banks' assets**  
(% of GDP)







**Holders of government debt securities**  
(% of GDP)



# Memo: except for France, a large chunk of the “rest of world” government debt holders are euro area residents


## Government debt by holders

(€ billion)



## Government debt by holders

(% of each country's GDP)



### Domestic holders

- Other resident
- Non monetary FI
- MFIs
- CB

### Foreign holders

- Foreign euro
- Foreign non euro



**This document is provided for information purposes only, it does not constitute an offer to buy or sell financial instruments, nor does it represent an investment recommendation or confirm any kind of transaction, except where expressly agreed.** Although Candriam selects carefully the data and sources within this document, errors or omissions cannot be excluded a priori. Candriam cannot be held liable for any direct or indirect losses as a result of the use of this document. The intellectual property rights of Candriam must be respected at all times, contents of this document may not be reproduced without prior written approval.

**Warning:** Past performances of a given financial instrument or index or an investment service, or simulations of past performances, or forecasts of future performances are not reliable indicators of future performances. Gross performances may be impacted by commissions, fees and other expenses. Performances expressed in a currency other than that of the investor's country of residence are subject to exchange rate fluctuations, with a negative or positive impact on gains. If the present document refers to a specific tax treatment, such information depends on the individual situation of each investor and may change.

The present document does not constitute investment research as defined by Article 36, paragraph 1 of the Commission delegated regulation (EU) 2017/565. Candriam stresses that this information has not been prepared in compliance with the legal provisions promoting independent investment research, and that it is not subject to any restriction prohibiting the execution of transactions prior to the dissemination of investment research.

**Candriam consistently recommends investors to consult via our website [www.candriam.com](http://www.candriam.com) the key information document, prospectus, and all other relevant information prior to investing in one of our funds, including the net asset value (“NAV) of the funds.** This information is available either in English or in local languages for each country where the fund’s marketing is approved.

**Specific information for Swiss investors:** The appointed representative and paying agent in Switzerland is RBC Investors Services Bank S.A., Esch-sur-Alzette, Zürich branch, Bleicherweg 7, CH-8027 Zurich. The prospectus, the key investor information, the articles of association or as applicable the management rules as well as the annual and semi-annual reports, each in paper form, are made available free of charge at the representative and paying agent in Switzerland..

