



# ING: Origination & Risk Management of Private Debt

**Linking Bank Loan Origination with Non-Bank Investors**  
**CFA Risk Management Event, 2 October 2025, Amsterdam**

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# Theo Korver | Head of Capital Management



Based in Cedar Amsterdam



Msc Economics VU Amsterdam, FRM



Started at ING in 2010 as Manager Business Development FM Sales



Banker for live (ABN AMRO / ING) short stint at PGGM



53 years, married with Monique, three kids

**...This presentation is on personal account.**



# Looking back at different Banking Models

## US Banks Lending Model

- Banks originate & distribute
- High use of Standardized Credit Models
- 70% of debt via Capital Markets (Bonds, Securitization, CLO's)
- 30% of debt via Bank Lending (EU banks dominating specialized lending)
- Risk Appetite / Optimized Structure: High risk / high margins / standardized documentations

## EU Banks Lending Model

- Banks originate & hold
- Extensive use of Internal Rating Credit Models
- 70% of debt via Bank Lending (Local EU banks competing with Pan European Players)
- 30% of debt via Capital Markets (Bonds)
- Risk Appetite / Optimize Structure: Low risk / low margins / specialized documentation
- Competition by insurers & asset managers only in specialized sectors (Infrastructure / Renewables)



**Original emergence of Private Debt firms: Direct debt origination, direct competition with banks  
=> Banks structure and underwrite (RCF Focus), Private Debt Funds lend (TLB Focus) and originate CLO's**

**Aim to capture illiquidity premium / improved risk profile.**

# But Basel IV has had a really strong impact on how banks operate



## Basel IV – Create Stable Payment & Banking System


### Impact Basel IV:

- Overall increased Capital Levels
- Minimum capital amounts & increased standardisation for Banks & Corporates
- Specialized lending possible but LGD Floors and increased model scrutiny
- Promote use of Capital Markets

### Reality:







- Strong growth of Private Debt in certain markets (a.o. Acquisition Finance)
- Increased participation of Non-Bank Investors in most markets (US, EU, Asia).
- Reduced bank appetite for certain type of markets: simply not profitable
- US Securitization market at 200% of 2007 volume, EU at 70%
- Strong focus on Originate to Distribute

## Strong growth in Private Debt



SOURCE: Preqin, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, as of December 31, 2023

# Leading to development of Distribution Tools, all with their own application and use


		Applicability: Pros/Cons	Typical Investors
FULL DISTRIBUTION	 <b>Primary syndications</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Strengthen <b>primary relationships</b></li> <li>✓ Generate <b>fee income</b></li> <li>✗ <b>No direct</b> RWA release</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Banks</li> <li>✓ Debt Funds</li> <li>✓ Insurance Companies</li> </ul>
	 <b>Secondary Loan Sales</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Ability to <b>reduce 100% RWA</b></li> <li>✓ Increase <b>Capital Velocity</b></li> <li>✗ Loan format and language dependent</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Banks</li> <li>✓ Debt Funds</li> <li>✓ Insurance Companies</li> </ul>
	 <b>Future Flow Partnerships</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Allows to underwrite <b>larger tickets</b></li> <li>✓ Strengthen <b>primary relationships</b></li> <li>✓ <b>Increase fee income/ skim</b></li> <li>✓ Free up limits, but skin in the game required</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Debt Funds</li> <li>✓ Insurance Companies</li> </ul>
RISK TRANSFER	 <b>CPRI</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ <b>Retain Assets</b> (silent risk transfer) &amp; part of <b>NIM</b></li> <li>✓ Support larger tickets size with full retention of fees</li> <li>✗ Sector <b>Caps</b></li> <li>✗ <b>Limited</b> RWA release, skin in the game required</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Re-Insurers</li> <li>✓ Insurance Companies</li> </ul>
	 <b>CDS</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ <b>Market</b> instead of though the cycle <b>pricing</b></li> <li>✗ <b>Limited set of names</b></li> <li>✗ Costly in times of stress</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Banks</li> <li>✓ Hedge Funds</li> </ul>
	 <b>Significant Risk Transfer</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Reduce RWA on <b>portfolio level</b></li> <li>✓ <b>Retain Assets</b> (silent risk transfer) &amp; part of <b>NIM</b></li> <li>✓ <b>The only optimization</b> tool for <b>illiquid assets (e.g. RCF)</b></li> <li>✗ Depends on <b>Model readiness</b></li> <li>✗ Requires <b>ECB Approval</b></li> <li>✗ Complex Structuring</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Specialised Asset Managers</li> <li>✓ Global Asset managers</li> <li>✓ Pension Funds</li> <li>✓ Supra's</li> </ul>




# With SRT now in the spotlight of attention both positive & negative

- **Global SRT issuance has grown recently.** The # of banks issuing SRT in the last 8 years doubled (ca. 70 banks in '22)
- **In '23, ca. 100 SRTs were issued in EU (EUR 140 bn).** UK, France and Italy with biggest issuance, while **Benelux is lagging**
- **Corporate Credit** (incl. Acquisition Finance) as a **key asset class covered by SRT ('23)**

## Underlying SRT Asset Class ('23)



## Italy, Germany and UK with the highest SRT issuances in Europe




## But still developing and maturing.

**Global Investor Base seeking access to general bank originated and serviced asset class but looking for Equity type returns**

Access to assets otherwise unattractive (ie RCF's):

- To low a yield
- Impact on liquidity

**SRT Investor Base**<sup>1</sup>



### **Global LP's:**

- 1 Sovereign Wealth Funds
- 2 Pension Funds
- 3 Central Banks
- 4 Insurance Companies
- 5 Endowment Funds
- 6 Family Offices


### **Global GP's, structuring for clients or own account:**

- 1 Part of Large Global Asset Managers (e.g. BlackStone, Blackrock)
- 2 Specialized Alternative Investment Funds (e.g. Mariner, PAG)
- 3 (Re)Insurance Companies (e.g. ARCH, AXA)
- 4 Pension Funds (e.g. PFZW, APG)
- 5 Sovereign Wealth Funds (e.g. GIC)

<sup>1</sup>ECB: A new high for SRT securitizations, August 2023

# SRT allows attractive investment opportunities and cost-effective risk distribution

## Illustrative example



## Upside:

- Dual benefit (originator / issuer)
- Immediate diversification
- New type of assets

## Downside:

- Complex
- Regulatory approval




# But is the solution for the Capital Markets Initiative also the introduction of new Systemic Risk?

## Regulatory focus

### ECB Supervision Blog June 2025: “Hidden leverage and blind spots”

- Providers of liquidity: Revolving Credit Facilities / Capital Call Facilities / (Il)liquid Repo Facilities
- Providers of leverage: NAV-Facilities, Balance Sheet Securitization, etc.

So has the risk been transferred off the bank balance sheets?



## To it's defense

- Generally Secured lending only
- Senior positions
- Very low default portfolio's
- Non – recourse
- LP exposures, limited GP exposure

## To it's detriment

- Non-regulated
- Non-transparent
- Generally illiquid
- Yield rather than risk focus
- Use of blind pools
- Interconnectedness unknown



## Conclusion / Food for Thought

- Private debt lending is here to stay
- Further growth expected and supported by regulation
- Role of bank lending to focus on selective markets:
  - Retail (large number of counterparties / highly regulated)
  - Flexibility (RCF's, construction facilities)
  - Non-Bank FI Liquidity and leverage providers

### But:

- Do we have sufficient assets to feed the demand?
- What returns over time are realistic?
- How interconnected are we actually and how to find out?

## Questions?



do your thing